Comments on: The AHIP Report: Beneath Questionable Numbers Is A Serious Concern http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/10/29/the-ahip-report-beneath-questionable-numbers-is-a-serious-concern/ The Policy Journal of the Health Sphere Tue, 07 Feb 2012 22:23:43 +0000 hourly 1 By: Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Still a Bad Idea - Hit & Run : Reason Magazine http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/10/29/the-ahip-report-beneath-questionable-numbers-is-a-serious-concern/comment-page-1/#comment-31629 Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Still a Bad Idea - Hit & Run : Reason Magazine Mon, 23 Nov 2009 23:24:32 +0000 http://healthaffairs.org/blog/?p=2617#comment-31629 [...] what the 2007 reforms in Massachusetts did was to bring more people into a very expensive pool, adding about 45,000 people to the individual market. That brought the prices down from their initial [...] [...] what the 2007 reforms in Massachusetts did was to bring more people into a very expensive pool, adding about 45,000 people to the individual market. That brought the prices down from their initial [...]

]]> By: Ken Jacobs http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/10/29/the-ahip-report-beneath-questionable-numbers-is-a-serious-concern/comment-page-1/#comment-31278 Ken Jacobs Thu, 29 Oct 2009 21:34:16 +0000 http://healthaffairs.org/blog/?p=2617#comment-31278 Behavioral economics would have something to say here as well. Just switching to an opt-out requirement for job-based coverage is likely to substantially increase take-up. As important as the penalty in incentivizing take-up, is the ease of doing so. How widely information is available about the exchange, clarity about choices within the exchange and potentially limits on those choices for the sake of simplicity, how easy it is to access subsidies and how often individuals are required to reapply for the subsidies, may have a far greater impact on take-up in the exchange than the size of the penalty. Also, given the general aversion to paying a penalty and receiving nothing in return, it is quite possible that the penalty need not be as high as the above equation would suggest in order to be effective. Behavioral economics would have something to say here as well. Just switching to an opt-out requirement for job-based coverage is likely to substantially increase take-up. As important as the penalty in incentivizing take-up, is the ease of doing so. How widely information is available about the exchange, clarity about choices within the exchange and potentially limits on those choices for the sake of simplicity, how easy it is to access subsidies and how often individuals are required to reapply for the subsidies, may have a far greater impact on take-up in the exchange than the size of the penalty.

Also, given the general aversion to paying a penalty and receiving nothing in return, it is quite possible that the penalty need not be as high as the above equation would suggest in order to be effective.

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