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Why We Still Kill Patients: Invisibility, Inertia, And Income



December 6th, 2010

A recent front-page article in the New York Times conveyed grim news about patient safety. The first large-scale study of hospital safety in a decade concluded that care has not gotten significantly safer since the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 estimate of up to 98,000 preventable deaths and 1 million preventable injuries annually.

What for me struck a particularly jarring note was not just the absence of improvement, but the reluctance of the health care leaders interviewed to speak candidly about why progress has been so slow. Instead, they offered nostrums about the need to “do more” or opined that “openness” or better “coordination” would somehow turn the tide.

But tucked in the actual study’s conclusions section, between bland boilerplate about “further study” and a “refocusing of resources,” some carefully worded candor cautiously peeked through: “[T]he absence of large-scale improvement is not evidence that current efforts to improve safety are futile,” wrote Christopher Landrigan and colleagues in the Nov. 25 New England Journal of Medicine. “On the contrary, data have shown that focused efforts to reduce discrete harms, such as nosocomial infections and surgical complications, can significantly improve safety.”

In plain language, we know how to prevent many of these patient deaths, but we don’t. That makes, “Why?” a lot tougher question.

It is a question that has haunted me since I discovered that clear descriptions of the medical error problem, its human cost and the corrective actions needed began appearing in the medical literature in the 1950s. The first large-scale study of hospital safety, by Don Harper Mills in California, was published in 1978. My extrapolation of its findings showed a preventable national death rate of about 120,000 patients annually. That’s roughly the same as the numbers from the oft-quoted Harvard Medical Practice Study published in 1991 that the IOM relied upon in its 1999 To Err is Human report. In human terms it means that 2.5 million men, women, and children died preventable deaths in U.S. hospitals during the 21 years between 1978 and 1999. A staggering seven to 17 million suffered preventable injuries.

The Silence Continues

I laid out those numbers in a March, 2003 Health Affairs article that challenged the profession to break a silence of deed — failing to take corrective actions — and a silence of word — failing to discuss openly the consequences of that failure. This pervasive silence, I wrote:

continually distorts the public policy debate [and] gives individuals and institutions that must undergo difficult changes a license to postpone them. Most seriously of all, it allows tens of thousands of preventable patient deaths and injuries to continue to accumulate while the industry only gradually starts to fix a problem that is both long-standing and urgent.

Nearly eight years later, medical professionals now talk freely about the existence of error and loudly about the need for combating it, but silence about the extent of professional inaction and its causes remains the norm. You can see it in this latest study, which decries the continuing “patient-safety epidemic” while failing to do next what any public health professional would instinctually do: tally up the toll. Instead, we get dry language about the IOM’s goal of a 50 percent error reduction over five years not being met.

Let’s fill in the blanks: If this unchecked “epidemic” were influenza and not iatrogenesis, then from 1999 to date it would have killed the equivalent of every man, woman and child in the cities of Raleigh (this study took place in North Carolina) and Washington, D.C. Does a disaster of that magnitude really suggest that “further study” and a “refocusing of resources” are what’s needed?

Why are we still killing so many patients? Call it the “three I’s”: invisibility, inertia and income.

The invisibility issue is commonly articulated this way: while airplane crashes kill a lot of people at once in a very public manner, medical error kills a few people at a time in private, spread out among thousands of hospitals. Moreover, most deaths occur among those who were already very sick, and only a small proportion represent negligence. This is inadvertent harm; there are no villains here. In any event, medical care is complicated. As a result, as a 2009 JAMA commentary pointedly noted, “Clinicians have labeled virtually all harm as inevitable for decades.”

That conviction is conveyed to and largely believed by patients. Why else would the advocacy groups for the sickest patients, such as the American Cancer Society or American Diabetes Association, pay so little attention to treatment-caused harm?  Absent public or peer pressure, doctors and hospitals are reluctant to adopt interventions whose efficacy they mistrust to prevent an epidemic they really don’t see and which is profoundly discomfiting to confront.

Letting Children Die Unnecessarily

There are many examples of the inertia these beliefs produce, but one I cannot get out of my mind concerns sick children. At the 2009 AcademyHealth meeting, Dr. Richard Brilli of Nationwide Children’s Hospital presented data showing how a collaborative backed by some of the most respected organizations in pediatric care had slashed the rate of catheter-associated bloodstream infections (CA-BSIs). CA-BSIs are relatively common, very expensive and can be quite deadly (up to one quarter of victims die). Brilli said his collaborative had tried to recruit 330 pediatric intensive care units to join the initial participants, but after three years, just sixty had accepted. The reasons Brilli said he’s been given indicated to me that few had taken the time to examine the collaborative’s methodology or results. Instead, respondents asserted that their patients were sicker, their hospital was busier than the others in the study, that joining would make them look bad to others, or that the mortality reduction didn’t apply because “I am in a world famous center.”

Now fast-forward to the February, 2010 issue of Pediatrics, in which the collaborative concluded: “CA-BSIs are a preventable cause of patient harm to critically ill children.” What you can’t see in the peer-reviewed literature is this context: at literally scores of hospitals which declined to participate in the collaborative, hundreds of sick children likely were injured or killed who probably would not have been harmed had the hospital been a collaborative member. Those harmed were tended to by dedicated staff who thought they were doing everything they could to help the kids in their care. They were dead wrong, but even today they may not know it. Certainly, their patients and the public do not.

I’ll cite just two other examples of inertia and invisibility interacting to impede change. When the Institute for Healthcare Improvement launched its “Save 100,000 Lives” Campaign on the fifth anniversary of the IOM report (the delay speaks for itself), four out of 10 U.S. hospitals still declined to participate. No policymakers or commentators questioned why 40 percent of hospitals would sit out this opportunity to improve care.

Another example: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published its first hand-washing guidelines in 1975. Yet nearly 35 years later, when the Joint Commission launched an improving hand hygiene project, the eight hospitals that volunteered had a baseline hand hygiene rate typical of hospitals nationwide: 48 percent.  That’s worse than the worst rate at the worst big public men’s room in the United States, according to one recent survey. But rather than giving providers an ultimatum, we launch campaigns to ask patients to ask providers to please wash up.

Most lethal of all is when invisibility and inertia interact with income. Ironically, the modern patient safety movement owes its foundational data to providers’ belief that malpractice insurance premiums were too high. The landmark studies of medical error published in 1978 and 1991 were backed by physician groups which hypothesized that unjustified lawsuits, not actual medical problems, were driving up premiums. In the event, research demonstrated that only a small percentage of errors resulted in lawsuits and an even smaller percentage in judgments. By that yardstick, the most recent study represents progress, since it was motivated by care improvement rather than income protection. Still, provider fear of being unjustly sued no doubt obstructs needed sharing of information and argues for malpractice reform.

Confronting The Belief That Complications Bring Extra Income

But there’s another elephant in the room that makes providers squirm even more. Put bluntly, many hospital executives believe they make money from complications. (Not from deaths, of course, because those shorten length of stay). Frustrated clinicians have personally told me this many times over the years, and as recently as a few weeks ago. The evidence has even made its way into the medical literature.

To cite just one example, let’s go back to those expensive bloodstream infections that affect the most vulnerable of patients, critically ill children, being cared for at the most eleemosynary of institutions, children’s hospitals. Even here, clinicians find themselves forced to argue that there is a “business case” for reducing CA-BSI’s in the pediatric intensive care unit.

In a recent journal article, the authors framed their case this way: Yes, infections increased the hospital stay by an average of nine days, and yes, insurers saved more money than hospitals by eliminating them. However, if a hospital filled the beds vacated by non-injured patients, it actually made more money because new patients provided more revenue in the first few days than tacking on those days to the hospital stay of patients already in the ICU. A clinical and financial win-win!

The Unknown Success Story Of Ascension Health

The ultimate irony about the silence surrounding patient safety is that one of the most extraordinary success stories in preventing harm has largely gone unheard. Ascension Health looks like most of the U.S. health care system, operating 65 community hospitals with independent medical staffs. Yet its program to eliminate all preventable injuries or deaths has been highly effective. They have carefully documented how they reduced infections, falls, complications of childbirth and a host of other common causes of patient harm to a fraction of national norms and saved more than 2,000 lives every year.

The clinical and  administrative leaders of Ascension Health, one of the nation’s largest Catholic health systems, made the invisible visible, and found that errors were far more prevalent than they thought. They declared that inertia would not be tolerated; all their affiliated hospitals had to participate. And they were willing to risk hospital income to prove that they were serious about change.

It is a story that so far seems to have excited only a few conference goers and regular readers of the Joint Commission Journal, which has been publishing articles about Ascension’s results since 2006.

As a society, we know what combination of social pressure, economic incentives and provision of tools to enable new behavior lead to transformational change. In patient safety we are using all of them, including various public and private programs to refuse payment for preventable error and publicize hospitals’ safety records. But at the front lines of patient care, it is all too clear that these efforts have yet to make much of a difference, as well-intentioned professionals silently turn away from the preventable harm we are still inflicting on those we are working so hard to help.

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5 Trackbacks for “Why We Still Kill Patients: Invisibility, Inertia, And Income”

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2 Responses to “Why We Still Kill Patients: Invisibility, Inertia, And Income”

  1. doctorblue Says:

    Practicing doctors need to work more closely with microbiologists (clued in to the latest medical findings) in adopting new methods for treating infections. For instance, microbiologists have long known that aerobic bacterial infections have anaerobic co-infections and that anaerobic bacterial infections have aerobic co-infections. To effectively eradicate most multi-infections, the patient needs to be given different medicines simultaneously. This is why microbiologists have been pressing wound care physicians to do both aerobic and anaerobic biopsies on their patients.

    The practicing doctors, for the most part, are refusing to do the anaerobic bacterial biopsies. Some say it is due to “turf wars” with the microbiologists. (No one likes someone else telling them what to do or that what they’ve been doing for centuries is not necessarily the appropriate thing to do.) Some speculate that it is because anaerobic germs are too difficult to biopsy since they die once exposed to air (oxygen). Too much trouble.

    I mention this because I have an anaerobic bacterial infection with aerobic bacterial and fungal co-infections, and no mainstream doctor I know (I’ve seen many) want anything to do with me even though Medicare covers hyperbaric oxygen therapy for my infection. Because the doctors refuse to recognize my old ignored library of positive test results proving I have this infection, the infection is causing my spine to further degenerate leading to more pain and ultimately carcinoma.

    Cutting tissue for a biopsy deep enough to encapsulate anaerobic pathogens (so they will not die once exposed to air) is known to cause anaerobic infections to rapidly spread. There are anecdotal reports of patients who underwent anaerobic biopsies that disfigured their neck or other areas to qualify for hyperbaric oxygen therapy only to find the biopsy caused the infection to spread to their lungs which precluded them from getting the treatment for which they got the biopsy.

    How ironic that in order to qualify for a Medicare covered treatment (hyperbaric oxygen therapy) patients must undergo invasive surgical removal of needed tissue whose side effects disqualify these patients from getting the treatment sought. Where’s the logic? An attorney must have come up with this rule for his doctors because Medicare does not require such biopsy (clinical diagnosis is acceptable).

    This is, nonetheless, considered to be standard medical practice, particularly among doctors who have no clue about diagnosing or treating anaerobic bacterial infections.

    The only doctors I found who know anything about anaerobic bacterial infections are microbiologists, who aren’t licensed to treat patients and will only speak to practicing physicians. Practicing physicians, in turn, see microbiologists as a threat to their territorial expertise and so are disinclined to speak with them.

    This is but one example among many in which specialists battle over what is considered proper diagnostic procedure and treatment for a patient. Each doctor views patient care based on typical care within his specialty without regard to therapy impact on other patient ailments or conditions. These battles all too often end up with all doctors throwing their hands in the air, thereby giving up on the patent who suffers at great monetary cost. Does this look like a model that puts the patient first or even anywhere in the equation?

    In my humble opinion, there is no monitoring of such behavior, nor action taken once noted. To think harmed patients have the means or energy to sue in an attempt to get competent care or reparation is pie-in-the-sky dreaming.

    We’ll never solve our medical woes without getting doctors to first find what it takes to work together and replace antiquated theories with treatments based on current medical knowledge or science. Doctors need to be responsible for learning what they don’t know about a patient appropriately presenting for treatment under their care. Doctors should not be allowed to prescribe invasive testing without doing a patient harm vs. benefit analysis based on an assumption that the patient has the ailment for which it is being tested.

    Doctors need to be more discerning about which patients are crackpots and which patients are armed with concrete tests and data that need to be considered and not tossed aside as mere filing material because doctors don’t like to read.

    After doctors have devised a game plan of how to capitalize on working together, the administrators can determine how this new model should be funded to make it viable. An impartial jury of sorts will need to decipher the pharmaceutical, insurance company and other monetary incentivized biases and deal with them appropriately after the ideal plan is agreed upon.

    Our current system appears to have been created in the reverse order with consideration given to biases and funding first. That’s why patient safety is no where in our present “system.”

  2. ebewley Says:

    Michael touches on a critical point when he quotes an article which observes that “clinicians have labeled virtually all harm as inevitable . . .”

    Hidden assumptions which justify the status quo appear to me to be the root cause of most failures in health care delivery. As Michael points out, the issue is not lack of knowledge (or technology or money). As Don Berwick noted years ago, the issue is “a deficiency of will and ambition.”

    Here are a few of the hidden assumptions on the part of health care providers that are almost guaranteed to harm patients:
     Patients are disruptive. (If they don’t conform to the system’s requirements, they are incompetent, self-centered, or deliberately trying to cause trouble.)
     All treatments work for everyone. (The push for compliance/adherence implicitly makes this assumption.)
     Side effects are no big deal. (Research shows that doctors don’t usually mention side effects up front, and typically dismiss patients reports of them once treatment has started – perhaps partly explaining why up to 19 million people a year land in the emergency room due to side effects of medicines they take.)
     Only good things happen as a result of the care I give. (That’s because I’m highly educated and well-intentioned.)
     The results of my care are the best it is possible to get. (As suggested by the comment Michael quotes explaining why some providers decline to participate in improvement efforts, “I am in a world famous center.”)
     If the patient has a bad outcome, it’s an act of God.

    It’s worth noting that campaigns to reduce drunk driving and the failure to use seat belts started with one critical step: they dared to say that injuries or fatalities related to these issues are not acts of God. They aren’t just unfortunate but inevitable consequences of living. Instead, bad outcomes in these areas are often the direct result of choices people make. The same is true in health care delivery.

    As Michael says, “There are no villains here.” Everybody means well. Unless assumptions like those above are explicitly exposed and challenged, though, another quotation might be apt: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”

    The writer is President & CEO of Pario Health Institute and the author of “Killer Cure: Why health care is the second leading cause of death in America and how to ensure that it’s not yours.”

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